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Abstract 
 
 
Interesting systems, whether biological or artificial, develop. Starting from some initial 
conditions, they respond to environmental changes, and continuously improve their 
capabilities. Developmental psychologists have dedicated significant effort to studying the 
developmental progression of infant imitation skills, because imitation underlies the 
infant’s ability to understand and learn from his or her social environment. In a converging 
intellectual endeavor, roboticists have been equipping robots with the ability to observe 
and imitate human actions because such abilities can lead to rapid teaching of robots to 
perform tasks. We here provide a comparative analysis between studies of infants imitating 
and learning from human demonstrators, and computational experiments aimed at 
equipping a robot with such abilities. We will compare the research across the following 
two dimensions: (a) initial conditions – what is innate in infants, and what functionality is 
initially given to robots, and (b) developmental mechanisms – how does the performance 
of infants improve over time, and what mechanisms are given to robots to achieve 
equivalent behaviour. Both developmental science and robotics are critically concerned 
with: (a) how their systems can and do go “beyond the stimulus” given during the 
demonstration, and (b) how the internal models used  in this process are acquired during 
the lifetime of the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
Preprint version; ﬁnal version available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Infant and Child Development (2008), vol: 17(1), pp: 43-53
DOI: 10.1002/icd.543
 3 
Introduction 
 
Robot designers are frequently faced with a problem that could be seen as an instance of 
the Nature vs. Nurture debate in the natural sciences. There is a general consensus that 
tabula rasa algorithms for robot learning are unlikely to be successful; unguided learning 
without any support will have difficulty overcoming the complexity involved even in 
simple tasks. However, there is a growing consensus among robot designers that pre-
imposing their own conceptions on the robot's control structure might prove 
counterproductive as they strive toward more adaptive robots that can learn to operate in 
changing human societies. Imitation, which is seen as a fundamental avenue of learning in 
humans (Meltzoff, 2007b), has been proposed as a promising method for a compromise 
between the two approaches. The robot architecture is designed to adapt in order to benefit 
from other agents' knowledge; imitation can be used as a mechanism of learning for the 
robot in human and robot societies (Demiris and Hayes 2002; Schaal et al 2003). But 
where do we start? What bootstrapping mechanisms should we strive to implement in 
robotic systems and how flexible are such systems as a result? 
 
Developmental psychologists have been studying human infants for more than a century, 
at first through observation and in the recent decades more systematically through 
experimental techniques, to determine what capabilities infants are born with and how 
these capabilities develop over time and with experience. Imitation invokes and 
coordinates the perceptual, representational, memory and motor neural systems of the 
infant, and as such is seen as a window into the infant’s sensorimotor and cognitive 
abilities. Imitation is proving to be useful in the diagnosis of, and theorizing about, 
disorders such as autism (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, and Rinaldi, 1998; Nadel, 2002; 
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Rogers, 1999) as well as visuoimitative apraxia (Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1997), due to 
its rich involvement of the underlying neural systems (Carey, Perrett, Oram, 1997). Infants 
gradually improve their abilities over the first years of their lives to reach a stage where 
they not only imitate the actions of demonstrators, but also the underlying intentions and 
goals of demonstrators (Meltzoff, 2007b).  
 
This paper presents a developmental analysis of imitation skills in infants and robots, 
focusing on a comparison of the work of the two authors (space limitations preclude a full 
survey of this burgeoning field, see (Breazeal and Scassellati 2002, Nehaniv and 
Dautenhahn, 2007, Schaal, 1999, Schaal et al 2003), for interesting surveys). 
Developmental studies of infant imitation skills can provide a source of inspiration for 
roboticists: new algorithms for tackling the problem of transferring skills from humans to 
robots can be derived by studying the hypotheses put forward with respect to infant 
imitation skills. Conversely, the drive towards precise descriptions so that mechanisms can 
be implemented on computational and robotic platforms serves to expose gaps in 
hypotheses and can suggest human developmental experiments for filling these gaps. 
 
System 0.0:  In the Beginning 
 
In the analysis of any developing system, the initial conditions play a crucial role. For 
infants this translates into investigating what imitation behaviour they are capable of 
displaying during the beginning of their postnatal life - not always an easy task. For robots 
this task is easier, since it simply involves describing the algorithms and initial knowledge 
that are pre-programmed into the robot before the imitation experiments begin. 
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Perceptually similar vs. perceptually opaque acts 
 
Imitation involves motor action towards a goal. The imitator, whether infant or robot, must 
be able to compare its current state with this goal in order to drive its motor system 
towards achieving this goal. This leads us to a distinction between types of imitation where 
the goal and the current state can be represented in the same modality, allowing a “direct” 
comparison, such as vocal imitation or imitation of hand gestures versus imitation of 
opaque acts that the agent cannot see or hear itself perform, such as facial imitation. From 
the robotics perspective the first case is relatively easy since a simple control mechanism 
that is trying to reduce the error between goal state and current state will suffice; in infant 
literature, given the relative immaturity of the infant’s motor system, issues such as 
imitation of hand gestures are difficult to investigate, although the available literature 
suggests it emerges quite early. The second case, facial imitation, is particularly interesting 
since it can illuminate the nature of representational and comparative mechanisms that 
neonatal infants posses and utilise during the imitation process. It is also significantly 
harder to achieve in robots since a mapping between states in different modalities needs to 
be established before an error-reducing controller can be implemented. Infants have been 
shown to imitate facial gestures as early as 42 minutes following birth (Meltzoff and 
Moore, 1983, 1989), implying the existence of a basic mechanism for comparing states 
across modalities (see Meltzoff and Moore, 1997, for detailed arguments concerning a 
possible role for prenatal movement experience).  
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From Observing to Imitating 
 
A mechanism that could accomplish both facial and manual imitation was provided by 
Meltzoff and Moore (1997) and termed the Active Intermodal Matching (AIM) model. A 
diagrammatic version of the model is shown in Figure 1a. The first computational 
implementation of this mechanism in a robotic platform was performed by (Demiris et al, 
1997) who used a robotic head to observe and imitate human head movements, a 
diagrammatic version of which is shown in figure 1b. More recently, Rao, Shon, and 
Meltzoff, (2007) proposed a probabilistic formulation of this mechanism, which has the 
potential of improving the robustness of such mechanisms to the uncertainty of the 
physical world, and the noise of the sensors used to perceive its current state.   
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 
The experiments of Demiris et al 1997 demonstrated that the AIM mechanism is 
computationally implementable, and sufficient for achieving imitation of movements, but 
also raised a number of interesting questions regarding the underlying representational 
mechanisms. 
 
(a) How can visual and proprioceptive representations be compared during imitation? The 
robotic experiments used the posture of the demonstrator as the “supramodal” unit of 
comparison, fulfilling the role of what (Meltzoff & Moore 1997) termed “organ relations”; 
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head joint angles were used to achieve the results in Demiris et al 1997.  Visual 
information regarding the state of the demonstrator arrive at the infants’ visual neural 
system, undergoing a series of representational transformations starting from the infant’s 
retina up to the higher level cortical areas. A similar process occurs in the proprioceptive 
system. AIM hypothesizes that these transformations eventually provide neural 
representations of “organ relations”, the supramodal representations that can be compared 
directly between the two modalities. Similarly, in Demiris et al 1997, visual and 
proprioceptive information are converted into postural representations, which can be used 
both for representing the state of the demonstrator as well as the state of the imitator. From 
experiments in monkeys we know that postural units of representation exist (neurons in the 
STS area fire according to the postural state of a demonstrator’s body parts (Carey et al 
1997), (Allison et al 2000)), but whether these are innate or develop with exposure to such 
stimuli is not known yet, and there has been less work in humans than in monkeys about 
the neural coding of body parts. Thus the progress in both developmental psychology and 
robotics suggests that neuroscience explorations of infant body representation will be an 
especially fruitful area, especially if we seek a fuller account of the mechanisms 
underlying human imitation.  
 
(b) What is retained in memory during the demonstration? Since the demonstration is a 
time-varying (spatiotemporal) representation, the robotic experiments revealed a number 
of choices: retaining the entire sequence of representation units (at a potentially high 
sampling rate), retaining only the final goal/endpoint, or as a compromise, retaining only 
representative units along the trajectory.  
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In infant development research, there is a growing body of work about ‘goals’, but this has 
been largely concentrated on older infants and children (e.g., Bekkering, Wohlschläger, 
and Gattis, 2000;  Meltzoff, 2007b; Williamson and Markman, 2006). However as it was 
shown in (Meltzoff and Moore 1983), newborns are indeed able to imitate static gestures, 
thus the goal/endpoint is clearly important, and in fact infants seem to be able to identify 
the means of achieving the endstate when they see the endstate.  
 
On the other hand, we also know that infants observe the particular action and not just an 
endpoint or goal, at least not broadly construed. They do imitate the particular means an 
adult uses. This is shown in the (Meltzoff, 1988) study of head touch where 14-month-olds 
copied the novel way the adult turned on a light (by touching a panel with his head). The 
adult did it using an unusual means, and the infants adopted that means instead of using 
their more familiar means, their own hands. So infants seem to be able to imitate based on 
the goal and also copy the means, although the timing of the onset of these mechanisms is 
an active topic of research (e.g, Williamson & Markman, 2006). 
 
Developmental change 
 
The imitation skills of infants do not remain static but rather improve over time and with 
experience. For example, older infants are capable of imitating not only the surface 
behaviour of demonstrators, but also understand their underlying goals and intentions. In 
an experiment by (Meltzoff, 1995, 2007b), 18-month old children were shown 
unsuccessful acts involving a demonstrator trying but failing to achieve his goal, i.e. the 
children did not see the successful end-state. Yet children did not replicate the 
unsuccessful surface behaviour of the adult but proceeded to imitate the intended goal, 
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even when it was never shown to them. Inferring the goals of the demonstrator enables 
infants (and robots) to go beyond the surface behaviour, and to engage in a more 
productive imitation. Children under about 1-year-old and younger seem to fail at this task 
(Bellagamba and Tomasello, 1999; Meltzoff, 2007b), although with a different paradigm 
and much easier acts such abilities might be demonstrable. An important development 
between 1 yr and 1.5 years seems to be taking place in the infant’s ability to infer goals 
(Meltzoff, 1995, 2007b). The conditions under which infants imitate exact actions versus 
reaching goals are receiving increased empirical scrutiny (e.g., Gleissner, Meltzoff, and 
Bekkering, 2000;  Williamson and Markman, 2006). 
 
The concentration on the goal while ignoring the surface behaviour implies that infants 
have acquired knowledge that is put into use during this inference process. Meltzoff 
(2007b) argued for the existence of a self-learning development phase, where infants’ 
bodily acts are associated with underlying mental states. Once the infants have built up this 
experience, they can use it to infer how the external state of the demonstrator relates to its 
internal one. They can understand others “by analogy with the self” (Meltzoff 2005, 2007a 
2007b). For robotics, this is an exciting proposition since it provides a pathway through 
which robots can autonomously discover how to behave within human societies. This 
proposition is not without difficulties, for example, finding a principled way for selecting 
the next dimension to explore among the many available in the state space. An example of 
this could be a principled way of selecting the next action (from the ones available to the 
agent) to execute for exploration purposes. This can become a key example of how 
developmental science and artificial intelligence can be mutually informative. 
 
Understanding others by analogy with the self 
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How can this process, “understanding others by analogy with the self” be implemented in 
robotic systems? In (Demiris and Hayes 2002, Demiris and Johnson 2003, Demiris and 
Khadhouri 2006) we proposed to do so through a computational architecture termed 
HAMMER (Hierarchical Attentive Multiple Models for Execution and Recognition).  
 
Inverse and Forward Models 
 
HAMMER makes extensive use of the concepts of inverse and forward models. An inverse 
model (akin to the concepts of a controller, behavior, or action) is a function that takes as 
inputs the current state of the system and the target goal(s) and outputs the control 
commands that are needed to achieve or maintain those goal(s). Related to this concept is 
that of a forward model of a controlled system: a forward model (akin to the concept of 
internal predictor) is a function that takes as inputs the current state of the system and a 
control command to be applied to it and outputs the predicted next state of the controlled 
system (Miall and Wolpert, 1996).  
 
The building block of HAMMER is an inverse model paired with a forward model (figure 
2). When HAMMER is asked to rehearse or execute a certain action, the inverse model 
module receives information about the current state (and, optionally, about the target 
goal(s)), and it outputs the motor commands that it believes are necessary to achieve or 
maintain these implicit or explicit target goal(s). The forward model provides an estimate 
of the upcoming states should these motor commands get executed. This estimate is 
returned back to the inverse model, allowing it to adjust any parameters of the action (an 
example of this would be achieving different movement speeds (Demiris and Hayes 
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2002)). Combinations of inverse and forward models are frequently used in motor control 
(Narendra and Balakrishnan 1997, Wolpert and Kawato 1998) due to their flexible 
modular structure, and have been advocated for use in imitation and learning (Demiris and 
Hayes 2002, Demiris and Khadhouri 2006, Schaal 1999, Schaal et al 2003, Wolpert et al 
2003).  
 
The Development of Inverse and Forward Models 
 
HAMMER’s basic building blocks are inverse and forward models. What is the origin of 
these in robots, what correspondence do these models have in infants, and how are they 
developed?  Meltzoff & Moore’s (1997) concept of ‘body babbling’ or ‘motor babbling’ is 
of fundamental importance here. It is a very powerful concept, derived from the infant 
data, with relevance and application in robotics.  Is the newborn infant capable of 
executing commands that will drive its motor system towards a desired goal (inverse 
models), and is the newborn infant capable of predicting consequences of its motor 
commands (forward models)?  
 
In robotics, forward models can be developed through an exploration process, akin to the 
“motor babbling” stage of infants. Sending a series of random motor commands to the 
robot’s apparatus, we can associate the motor commands with their visual, proprioceptive 
or environmental consequences (including the expected time that they will appear 
(Dearden and Demiris, 2005)). Building associations between actions and consequences 
through motor babbling means that these associations can be inverted (Demiris and 
Dearden 2005) to create approximations to basic inverse models. Observation and 
imitation can play a key role at this stage: once basic inverse models have been created, by 
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observing and imitating others (observation of how certain goals can be achieved) the 
robot can combine (chain together, and/or place in parallel) basic blocks to form more 
useful complex inverse models.  
 
In infants the situation is less clear: as we described earlier, infants get some ‘goals’ from 
observing others. But they also seem to generate random acts and then want to ‘perfect 
them’ themselves (Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl, 2001; Piaget, 1952). They may watch their 
hand float across their visual field and then ‘want to gain control’ of this sight. This causes 
them to repeat it again and again until they’ve mastered it. Infants seem to be born with 
this innate ‘mastery motivation‘(Gopnik et al., 2001; Meltzoff and Moore, 1997). 
 
In the demonstrator’s shoes 
 
HAMMER uses an inverse-forward model coupling in a dual role: either for executing an 
action, or for perceiving the same action when performed by a demonstrator. If HAMMER 
is to determine whether a visually perceived demonstrated action matches a particular 
inverse-forward model coupling (figure 2), the demonstrator's current state as perceived by 
the imitator is fed to the inverse model. The inverse model generates the motor commands 
that it would output if it was in that state and wanted to execute this particular action. In a 
sense, the imitator processes the actions by analogy with the self – “what would I do if I 
was in the demonstrator’s shoes?” 
 
In the perception or planning modes, the motor commands are inhibited from being sent to 
the motor system. The forward model outputs an estimated next state, which is a prediction 
of what the demonstrator's next state will be. This predicted state is compared with the 
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demonstrator's actual state at the next time step. As seen in figure 2 below and the text that 
follows, this comparison results in an error signal that can be used to increase or decrease 
the behaviour's confidence value, which is an indicator of how closely the demonstrated 
action matches a particular imitator's action.  
 
 
INSERT  Figure 2 HERE 
 
 
HAMMER consists of multiple pairs of inverse and forward models that operate in parallel 
[Demiris and Hayes 2002]. When the demonstrator agent executes a particular action the 
perceived states are fed into all of the imitator's available inverse models. As described 
earlier, this generates multiple motor commands (representing multiple hypotheses as to 
what action is being demonstrated) that are sent to the forward models. The forward 
models generate predictions about the demonstrator's next state: these are compared with 
the actual demonstrator's state at the next time step, and the error signal resulting from this 
comparison affects the confidence values of the inverse models. At the end of the 
demonstration (or earlier if required) the inverse model with the highest confidence value, 
i.e. the one that is the closest match to the demonstrator’s action is selected. Demiris and 
Hayes, 2002, Demiris 2007 have described the relation of this process to a biological 
counterpart, the mirror system (Gallese et al, 1996), offering a number of explanations and 
testable predictions (Demiris and Hayes 2002, Demiris and Simmons, 2006), for example, 
a predicted dependency of the firing rate of the macaque monkey mirror neurons to the 
velocity profile of the demonstrated act.  
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Beyond the stimulus given 
 
Where do we go from here? As we described, infants do not simply react to the stimulus 
given to them, and architectures for implementing a model-based (versus purely stimulus 
reactive) approach in robots have already been proposed. In both disciplines the challenge 
remains in how human action models are acquired and integrated with the (potentially 
incomplete or confusing) observed stimulus to derive the demonstrator’s goals and 
intentions. From the robotics perspective, challenging questions that remain unanswered 
within the multiple inverse-forward models formulation include: 
 
How are the human action models organised? In robots, hierarchical formulations have 
been proposed and used (Demiris and Johnson, 2003, Tani and Nolfi 1999), but their 
relation to biological data has not been explored (but see Demiris and Simmons 2006). 
Recent evidence on how infants encode goals also suggests hierarchical representations 
(Bekkering et al., 2000; Gleissner et al. 2000), making this a potential interesting area for 
interdisciplinary collaboration. 
• How do the observer’s internal models and prior knowledge influence what parts of 
the stimulus will be attended to? We have suggested elsewhere (Demiris and 
Khadhouri 2006) a computationally principled method for solving this, based on 
the motor theory of perception, but again the relation to biological/developmental 
data requires further exploration. 
• The class of theories being described here require the observer to “step into the 
demonstrator’s shoes”, essentially take the perspective of the demonstrator (for 
relevant neuroscience data, see Jackson, Meltzoff, and Decety, 2006). Although 
algorithmic solutions to this have been proposed (Johnson and Demiris, 2005, 
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Breazeal et al 2006, Trafton et al 2005), higher levels of perspective taking, 
including beliefs, desires, and intentions remain difficult challenges in robotics. 
These mechanisms can be informed from developmental work on gaze following, 
which can be viewed as the lowest end of perspective taking. One year old infants 
follow the gaze of adults and understand that it is directed at an object, and is not 
yet another meaningless body movement (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002, 2005; 
Carpenter, Nagell, and Tomasello, 1998; Flom, Lee, & Muir, 2006). The evidence 
points to a use of first-person experience to make third-person attributions; for 
example, it has been shown that once infants had experience with blindfolds, the 
interpretation of others who wear blindfolds was changed (Meltzoff, 2007a; 
Meltzoff & Brooks, 2004). The robotics work on action understanding (Demiris 
and Johnson 2003), and particularly the perceptual perspective taking architecture 
is compatible with these findings (Johnson and Demiris 2005); perceptual 
perspective taking allowed an observer robot to “place itself in the demonstrator 
robot’s perceptual shoes” and engage the inverse models that were compatible with 
the demonstrator’s viewpoint rather than its own viewpoint (Johnson and Demiris 
2005). While there is still a lot of work to be done in robotics on this aspect, 
research on the development of perspective taking and its roots in gaze following 
(Meltzoff, 2005, 2007a) has the potential of providing robotics researchers with 
important insights on how these mechanisms can be implemented. 
 
To conclude, according to Meltzoff’s (2007a, 2007b) “Like Me” theory, the mechanisms 
involved in successful imitation are the developmental foundation for the later emergence 
of other higher-order skills in human social cognition. The child bootstraps from 
recognizing that they can act like another agent to the realization that the other has 
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desires/intentions that generate the actions, just like the self does. The HAMMER 
architecture (Demiris and Khadhouri, 2006) and the work on learning inverse and forward 
models (Dearden and Demiris, 2005; Demiris and Dearden, 2005) use these ideas to 
develop analogous skills for robots so that they can operate usefully among humans as 
robotic assistants. Conversely, we believe that work in robotics will also help sharpen 
ideas about the details of this developmental mechanism. 
 
Acknowledgments  
 
This work has been supported in the UK (YD) by the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) and the Royal Society, and in the USA (AM) by NIH (HD-
22514) and NSF (SBE-0354453). 
 
References 
Allison, T., Puce, A., & McCarthy, G. (2000). Social perception from visual cues: Role of 
the STS region. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 267-278. 
Bekkering, H., Wohlschläger, A., & Gattis, M. (2000). Imitation of gestures in children is 
goal-directed. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53A, 153-164. 
Bellagamba, F., & Tomasello, M. (1999).  Re-enacting intended acts: Comparing 12- and 
18-month-olds. Infant Behavior & Development, 22, 277-282. 
Breazeal C. and Scassellati B. (2002).  Robots that imitate humans, Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 6, 481-487. 
Breazeal C, Berlin M, Brooks A, Gray J., and Thomaz A. (2006). Using Perspective 
Taking to Learn from Ambiguous Demonstrations, Robotics and Autonomous 
Systems, 54, 385-393. 
Preprint version; ﬁnal version available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Infant and Child Development (2008), vol: 17(1), pp: 43-53
DOI: 10.1002/icd.543
 17 
Brooks, R., & Meltzoff, A.N.  (2002).  The importance of eyes:  How infants interpret 
adult looking behavior.  Developmental Psychology, 38, 958-966. 
Brooks, R., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2005). The development of gaze following and its relation 
to language. Developmental Science, 8, 535-543. 
Carey, D. P., Perrett, D. I., & Oram, M. W. (1997). Recognizing, understanding and 
reproducing action. In F. Boller & J. Grafman (Eds.), Handbook of Neuropsychology 
(Vol. 11, pp. 111-129). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
Carpenter, M., Nagell, K., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Social cognition, joint attention, and 
communicative competence from 9 to 15 months of age. Monographs of the 
Society for Research in Child Development, 63 (4, Serial No. 255). 
Dawson, G., Meltzoff, A. N., Osterling, J., & Rinaldi, J. (1998). Neuropsychological 
correlates of early symptoms of autism. Child Development, 69, 1276-1285. 
Dearden, A., & Demiris, Y. (2005). Learning forward models for robots. In Proceedings of 
the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) (pp. 1440-1445). 
Edinburgh. 
Demiris, Y. (2007). Using robots to study the mechanisms of imitation, in 
Neuroconstructivism II – Perspectives and Prospects, Mareschal, D, Sirois S., 
Westermann G., and Johnson M. (eds), (pp.159-178), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Demiris, Y., & Dearden, A. (2005). From motor babbling to hierarchical learning by 
imitation: A robot developmental pathway. In L. Berthouze, et al. (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Epigenetic Robots (EPIROB): 
Modeling Cognitive Development in Robotic Systems (pp. 31-37). Japan. 
Demiris, J., Rougeaux, S., Hayes, G. M., Berthouze, L., & Kuniyoshi, Y. (1997). Deferred 
imitation of human head movements by an active stereo vision head. Proceedings of 
Preprint version; ﬁnal version available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Infant and Child Development (2008), vol: 17(1), pp: 43-53
DOI: 10.1002/icd.543
 18 
the 6th International Workshop on Robot and Human Communication (IEEE), 88-93, 
Sendai, Japan. 
Demiris, Y., & Hayes, G. (2002). Imitation as a dual-route process featuring predictive and 
learning components: A biologically plausible computational model. In K. 
Dautenhahn & C. L. Nehaniv (Eds.), Imitation in animals and artifacts (pp. 327-
361). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Demiris, Y., & Johnson, M. (2003). Distributed, predictive perception of actions: A 
biologically inspired robotics architecture for imitation and learning. Connection 
Science, 15, 231-243. 
Demiris, Y., & Khadhouri, B. (2006). Hierarchical attentive multiple models for execution 
and recognition of actions. Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 54, 361-369. 
Demiris, Y., & Simmons, G. (2006). Perceiving the unusual: temporal properties of 
hierarchical motor representations for action perception. Neural Networks, 19, 272-
284. 
Flom, R., Lee, K., & Muir, D. (Eds.). (2006). Gaze following: Its development and 
significance. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the 
premotor cortex. Brain, 119, 593-609. 
Gleissner, B., Meltzoff, A. N., & Bekkering, H. (2000). Children's coding of human action: 
Cognitive factors influencing imitation in 3-year-olds. Developmental Science, 3, 
405-414. 
Goldenberg, G., & Hagmann, S. (1997). The meaning of meaningless gestures: A study in 
visuo-imitative apraxia. Neuropsychologia, 35, 333-341. 
Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Kuhl, P. K. (2001). The scientist in the crib: What early 
learning tells us about the mind. New York: Harper Paperbacks. 
Preprint version; ﬁnal version available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Infant and Child Development (2008), vol: 17(1), pp: 43-53
DOI: 10.1002/icd.543
 19 
Johnson, M., & Demiris, Y. (2005). Perceptual perspective taking and action recognition. 
International Journal of Advanced Robotic Systems, 2, 301-308. 
Jackson, P. L., Meltzoff, A. N., & Decety, J. (2006). Neural circuits involved in imitation 
and perspective-taking. NeuroImage, 31, 429-439. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1988). Infant imitation after a 1-week delay: Long-term memory for novel 
acts and multiple stimuli. Developmental Psychology, 24, 470-476. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended 
acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31, 838-850. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2005). Imitation and other minds: The "Like Me" hypothesis. In S. Hurley 
& N. Chater (Eds.), Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social science 
(Vol. 2, pp. 55-77). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2007a). ‘Like me’: a foundation for social cognition. Developmental 
Science, 10, 126-134. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (2007b). The ‘like me’ framework for recognizing and becoming an 
intentional agent. Acta Psychologica, 124, 26-43. 
Meltzoff, A. N., & Brooks, R. (2004, May). Developmental changes in social cognition 
with an eye towards gaze following. In M. Carpenter & M. Tomasello (Chair), 
Action-based measures of infants' understanding of others' intentions and attention. 
Symposium conducted at the Biennial meeting of the International Conference on 
Infant Studies, Chicago, Illinois. 
Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1983). Newborn infants imitate adult facial gestures. 
Child Development, 54, 702-709. 
Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1989). Imitation in newborn infants: Exploring the range 
of gestures imitated and the underlying mechanisms. Developmental Psychology, 25, 
954-962. 
Preprint version; ﬁnal version available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Infant and Child Development (2008), vol: 17(1), pp: 43-53
DOI: 10.1002/icd.543
 20 
Meltzoff, A. N., & Moore, M. K. (1997). Explaining facial imitation: A theoretical model. 
Early Development and Parenting, 6, 179-192. 
Miall, R. C., & Wolpert, D. M. (1996). Forward models for physiological motor control. 
Neural Networks, 9, 1265-1279. 
Nadel, J. (2002). Imitation and imitation recognition: Functional use in preverbal infants 
and nonverbal children with autism. In A. N. Meltzoff & W. Prinz (Eds.), The 
imitative mind: Development, evolution, and brain bases (pp. 42-62). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Narendra K.S. and Balakrishnan J., Adaptive Control using Multiple Models, IEEE 
Transactions on Automatic Control, 42, 171-187.  
Nehaniv C. and Dautenhahn K. (2007), Imitation and Social Learning in Robots, Humans 
and Animals, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children (M. Cook, Trans.). New York: 
International Universities Press. 
Rao, R. P. N., Shon, A. P., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2007). A Bayesian model of imitation in 
infants and robots. In C. L. Nehaniv & K. Dautenhahn (Eds.), Imitation and social 
learning in robots, humans, and animals:  Behavioural, social and communicative 
dimensions (pp. 217-247). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rogers, S. J. (1999). An examination of the imitation deficit in autism. In J. Nadel & G. 
Butterworth (Eds.), Imitation in infancy (pp. 254-283). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schaal, S. (1999), Is Imitation learning the route to humanoid robots?, Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 3, 233-242,. 
Schaal, S., Ijspeert, A., & Billard, A. (2003). Computational approaches to motor learning 
by imitation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 
Preprint version; ﬁnal version available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Infant and Child Development (2008), vol: 17(1), pp: 43-53
DOI: 10.1002/icd.543
 21 
Biological Sciences, 358, 537-547. 
Tani J. and Nolfi S., (1999), Learning to perceive the world as articulated: an approach for 
hierarchical learning in sensory motor systems, Neural Networks, 12, 1131-1141. 
Trafton J., Cassimatis N., Bugajska M., Brock D., Mintz F. and A. Schultz, Enabling 
Effective Human-Robot Interaction using Perspective Taking in Robots, IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics Part A: Systems and Humans, 35,  
460-470. 
Wolpert D. M. and Kawato M. (1998),  Multiple paired forward and inverse models for 
motor control,  Neural Networks, 11,  1317:1329. 
Wolpert D. M., Doya K., Kawato M. (2003) A unifying computational framework for 
motor control and social interaction, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
of London. Series B, Biological Sciences,358, 593-602. 
Williamson, R. A., & Markman, E. M. (2006). Precision of imitation as a function of 
preschoolers' understanding of the goal of the demonstration. Developmental 
Psychology, 42, 723-731. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preprint version; ﬁnal version available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Infant and Child Development (2008), vol: 17(1), pp: 43-53
DOI: 10.1002/icd.543
 22 
FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The theory of Active Intermodal Matching (Meltzoff & Moore 1997) and the 
outline of the robotic implementation from (Demiris et al 1997) 
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  Figure 2: HAMMER’s basic building block, an inverse model paired with a forward 
model (from Demiris & Hayes 2002, Demiris and Johnson 2003) 
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